Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science summary Á E-book or Kindle E-pub

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Kuhn vs. Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science summary Á E-book, or Kindle E-pub Ê قُيض لتصور توماس كون في تحول الباراديمات ذلك الذي يكاد يجمع المختصون على أنه يشكل حد فلسلفة العلم الحديثة الفاصل?سئلة حيوية هل بمقدور العلم أن يظل قوة مستقلة تقدمية في المجتمع أم أن مآله أن يظل الجناح التقني للمركب العسكري الصناعي بالركون إلى نصوص أصلية يؤمِن فولر تصورا واضحا لخبايا الصراع بين كون وبوبر ولأهمية هذا الصراع بالنسبة إلى مستقبل البحث العلمي. Kuhn's basic concept was “paradigm” which is the “idea that scientific inuiry is anchored in an exemplar that researchers then use as a model for future investigations” Kuhn sees a paradigm as an irrefutable theory that becomes an irreversible policy ie researchers only work toward things they know rather than radical change Therefore Kuhn's concept is conformist and inherently uncritical He has a backward look He is an elitist who sees science as a stabilizing social practicePopper's basic concept is “falsification” through testing which draws the demarcation line between science and non science Science is the standard bearer for critical rationalism Scientific inuiry and democratic politics are alternative expressions of an “open” society Popper is looking forward because our knowledge is always subject to improvementKuhn was “historicist” Things could be no other than they are and likely to be somewhat authoritarian as he sees science as rewriting history to show the latest find as in line with everything that has led up to it while Popper was “criticist” We can always do better and thus could be seen as somewhat libertarian This is pretty interesting as Kuhn is associated at least in thought with folks like Derrida and Foucault who are very leftist Not that there have not been authoritarian leftists and Popper has a reputation of being conservative rather than libertarian

characters Ç E-book, or Kindle E-pub ¸ Steve Fuller

ي قدرة العلم الثورية على دحض عقائد المجتمع ولكن هل كان هذا النصر مفيدا للعلم ؟ يجادل ستيف فولر في هذا الكتاب بأن هيمنة تصور توماس كون قد أدت إلى نتائج سلبية في مجال فلسفة العلم وبأن كون وبوبر قد تعرضا خلال ذلك إلى إساءة فهم متطرفة يثير هذا الجدل ?. Steve Fuller explains the views of two prominent science philosophers of the 20th century and the relevance of their debate in today's scientific endeavor In 1965 Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn sat down to debate about the nature of scientific progress The legacy of this encounter has influenced intellectual discussions on the topic ever sinceKuhn viewed paradigms a set of received and accepted beliefs as an essential component of the scientific inuiry A paradigm molds a group into a discipline around which specialized journals and societies shape He called science activities performed within a paradigm as normal science This is basically what majority of scientists do most of the times Doing routine research in this sense is basically like solving a puzzle Puzzles have rules Puzzles generally have predetermined solutions which are determined by the paradigm Occasionally anomalies start to build up and scientists begin to lose faith in their paradigm Despite the initial resistance this eventually leads to a shift in the paradigm Popper on the other hand saw a monstrous gap in philosophy and science inductive reasoning According to him for a theory to be scientific it must be able to be proven wrong – falsified by anyone and with results that are reproducibleFuller describes Kuhn as an authoritarian and Popper as a libertarian in their positions to science This point has been mostly forgotten if not inverted by those who regard ‘Kuhn vs Popper’ as a landmark in modern philosophy of science Unfortunately 40 years later Kuhn seems to have had the last laugh and his views became widely accepted by the scientific community Steve Fuller argues that not only has Kuhn's dominance had an adverse impact on the field but both thinkers have been radically misinterpreted in the processThis book assumes that the reader is well aware of Kuhn's and Poper's views of scientific progress and their influences on the scientific community It would have been nice if it covered the basics of these views before jumping onto the social and political contexts of them Other references used and further readings 1 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn 19622 The Logic of Scientific Discovery Karl Popper 19343 Outlines and summary of Kuhn's work Frank Pajares

Steve Fuller ¸ 9 summary

Kuhn vs Popper The Struggle for the Soul of Scienceقُيض لتصور توماس كون في تحول الباراديمات ذلك الذي يكاد يجمع المختصون على أنه يشكل حد فلسلفة العلم الحديثة الفاصل والذي يقر أن العلم مجرد نشاط بشري آخر مثله مثل الفن والفلسفة وإن كان أكثر تخصصية أن يحقق الإنتصار على مذهب كارل بوبر الأكثر وضعية ف. Update Fuller tweeted regarding this review saying This is actually uite a good review of my book from 15 years ago precisely because it seems to have got under its author's skin in just the right way Take that how you willThe original reviewThe only good aspect of this book is that it's short In Chapter 6 Fuller uotes Feyerabend asKuhn’s ideas are interesting but alas they are much too vague to give rise to anything but lots of hot air Never before has the literature on the philosophy of science been invaded by so many creeps and incompetents Kuhn encourages people who have no idea why a stone falls to the ground to talk with assurance about the scientific method Now I have no objection to incompetence but I do object when incompetence is accompanied by boredom and self righteousnessI'm taking the inclusion of this as some kind of Freudian slip where Fuller accidentally includes a devastating critical description of his own book It's fine to not like a philosopher but this was such a hatchet job for the most part it's hard to believe this isn't some elaborate spoof of science studiesTo be fair to Fuller there is one legitimate criticism of Kuhn he actually does make which is that Kuhn focuses too much on the internal history of science which takes what scientists are doing and saying at face value ignoring the broader context and effects of scienceEven when writing about scientific experiments the Kuhnian's focus remained fixed on the role of experiments in generating data solving puzzles or testing theories – not on their material character as say an economist concerned with ‘externalities’ would treat experiments In particular he made a point of not asking whether the instruments used in experiments were inspired andor applied in a military industrial setting outside the experimental contextThis is a real and serious charge because although Kuhn doesn't it actually is important to consider the role science plays in society given its prestige and ability to supplement the power of those who can shape and wield it That's not unfair There really does need to be serious thought about professionalization the role university centred academic practices shape science the ways in which the needs of industry stealthily hijack the agenda etc If this was all Fuller had written about this would have been a pretty good bookThe problem is that Fuller takes this legitimate criticism that there are aspects of science Kuhn does not take seriously and warps it into a total denunciation of everything he stood for Which isn't necessarily illegitimate except Fuller doesn't seem to understand what the point of Kuhn's study was An internal history might miss out on some aspects of science but that helps bring others into focus Specifically what Fuller doesn't seem sensitive to is that science is fucking hard and an analysis of how its various internal elements observation experimentation theory prediction alteration etc come together is actually incredibly insightful Fuller's reliance on an overly simplistic view of science keeps showingAfter all physicists gain the respect of their peers by designing clever experiments whose results can be captured by elegant mathematical formalisms all the while remaining agnostic about the metaphysical significance of their inuiries This is what makes physics a specialised science as opposed to a total ideologyIt's this idea that science as some ridiculously straightforward activity that causes him to dismiss the arduous job Kuhn insists on doing So while Fuller thinks just reading a lot of philosophy euips him to deal with Kuhn without a scientific background he isn't able to see what role Kuhn's ideas playFor example he claimsPopper held that truth is always ‘transcendent’ of the community of inuirers whereas for Kuhn truth is always ‘immanent’ in the community If Kuhn located truth within a scientific paradigm Popper found it in a ‘meta language’ into which the knowledge claims of the paradigm may be translated and evaluatedBut the point of a paradigm isn't that truth isn't located within the paradigm but rather that to engage in science you have to take onboard an enormous amount of assumptions and technical apparatus to truly stand on the shoulder of giants Neptune wasn't discovered through clever experiments that popped out of nowhere; the cumulative knowledge of centuries of people within the Newtonian paradigm was necessary before it could even be suspected to exist That science might not be about simplistic testing but using assumptions and creativity to learn about the world completely evades FullerThis insensitivity to how hard and complicated science actually is leads Fuller to become incensed that philosophers are being too deferential to science Which isn't necessarily bad criticism since the aspects of science which makes it so important to society necessitate that philosophers care about broader contexts But Fuller apparently wants to criticize scientists for their science itselfPost Kuhnians have come to accept scientists’ working assumptions at face value including the counter intuitive implication that reality consists of many distinct worlds each roughly corresponding to a scientific discipline For example whereas Lakatos had called on historians philosophers and sociologists to master the technical details of contemporary science so as not to depend on scientists’ own ex cathedra pronouncements about the merits of their research programmes Kuhn’s progeny master such details in order to impress scientists that they are sufficiently competent to be taken seriously at all Kuhn’s reduction of the ends of science to the trajectories already being pursued by particular sciences has now inspired two generations of philosophers to believe that they should be taking their normative marching orders from the sciences they philosophise about and hence do not uestion them unless the scientists themselves have done so firstApparently philosophers are going to find something that the entire peer reviewed establishment missed And how can you start without accepting that there are distinct domains of inuiry in science There is such naivete you know this can't be really be about understanding or wanting to get science to live up to its idealsThis brings us to what's actually going on with Fuller's criticism Driven by moral concerns Fuller seems insistent on denying that knowledge reuires such discipline that certain discoveries can only be made through cumulative build upIn science this sense of ‘irrationality’ is most evident in its slavish adherence to track record – what Popper demonised as ‘induction’ – whereby the sheer fact that a particular discovery was made under the aegis of a particular theory is used as the basis for claiming that only upholders of that theory have proper access to that discoverySure sometimes Fuller tries to phrase this as simply claiming that sometimes being in a paradigm might limit progress but the general text makes clear that his views are radical In opposition to this paradigm driven science he support's Popper's views where a perpetual openness to change is necessary to evade fascism Otherwise philosophers and scientists would simply be evading their responsibilityWhile neither Kuhn nor Popper would care to deny that a specific paradigm may dominate the understanding of a particular slice of reality at particular time they differ over whether it should be treated as a source of stability Kuhn or a problem to be overcome Popper If all that's being said is that scientists shouldn't be too complacent then great Kuhn can agree too But the allusion to fascism makes clear that Fuller is anti paradigm itself which means his views aren't even remotely similar to anything actually done in science which to my mind makes it somewhat uselessAnd I know I've dunked on Fuller but maybe the worst aspect of the book is that large parts of it aren't even arguments they're just random name dropping and idea scatteringWhereas Popper treated the scientific laboratory as a site for making decisions each of which may be reversed by a later one Kuhn regarded the laboratory as a site for engaging in practices that deepen the scientist’s susceptibility to forming certain beliefs that will contribute to a clearer grasp of the vision of reality projected by her paradigm Here Kuhn follows a long line of post Augustinian thinkers from Blaise Pascal to the John Henry Newman for whom ‘justified belief’ or ‘real assent’ was characterised in most un Popperian terms by a willingness to risk one’s life on an idea through practical devotion a return to the etymological roots of ‘religion’ in the enchanted ritualisation of life Apart from the poor reading and understanding of Kuhn and science what exactly is the role of regarding this as post Augustinian Is this meant to merely point out a uaint similarity between unconnected ideas or something substantive I just imagine Fuller going ¯ツ¯To wrap up there really are some great uestions about the sociology of modern science and its effects on the creation of knowledge within the current set up But it's hard to read this book and not think that to uote Kuhn out of context Fuller too has left scholarship behind for politics